While the outcome of the UK’s general election was a foregone conclusion, there were nevertheles some intruiging developments. Besides the ruling Conservative’s worst-ever showing, the victorious Labour Party’s dramatic revival was tempered by a decline in its Muslim vote. This paved the way for the election of five independent pro-Palestinian members of parliament primarily from Britain’s Muslim population. Several minor parties also saw an upsurge in fortunes, including Reform, whose five MPs include Nigel Farage, an architect of Brexit and now self-styled “real leader of the British oppostion.”

Taken at face value, Reform’s presence in the House of Commons looks paltry against Labour’s 411 MPs. However, thanks to Britan’s first-past-the-post electoral system, the party was able to split a disaffected Conservative vote, gifting seats to Labour while sending Farage to Parliament at the eighth time of asking. In doing so, Britain’s leading populist politician has presented the Conservative Party with an existential dilemma: lurch further to the right on issues such as immigration or return to the political centerground.

Crossroads and Contracts

Either scenario provides Farage with opportunities. A harder stance will bring the party closer to Reform, increasingly home to voters that no longer feel the Conservatives are conservative enough. Should this occur, there would be little reason for the Conservative Party and Reform to co-exist. Farage nevertheless paints a confusing picture regarding his relations with the party he left in 1992. While Reform’s election campaign focused on upending the Labour-Conservative duopoly, he was reported to have said last year that he envisaged being leader of the Conservatives by 2026. Doing so would likely result in Reform being subsumed by the Conservatives’ superior party machine.

A return to moderation could further efforts to appeal to voters sympathetic to Reform’s policies but stayed loyal to the Conservatives at the last election. Farage will continue to portray the party as little different to the current government. The clearer the water between the Conservatives and Reform over issues that provide the latter’s raison d'être, the greater the opportunity to push the former into obscurity. Reform’s dominance of the right of Britain’s political spectrum will ensure populist narratives define rather than inform opposition to the Labour government.

There’s reason to believe that Farage’s rhetoric will reach its intended targets. Like all populists, Farage portrays himself as a straight-talking everyman attuned to the grievances of the sons of his shared soil. His solutions are obvious, straightforward, and devoid of nuance and complexity. Reform’s ‘contract’ with the British people is a case in point. Effectively the party’s election manifesto, the 28-page document is big on intent, but devoid of substance.

Besides renegotiating trading terms with the European Union and freeing the UK from the World Economic Forum and other ‘globalist’ organizations, Reform’s ‘contract’ lacks a clear and coherent foreign policy. This is hardly surprising given populism’s dependence on ‘me first’ narratives. It nevertheless raises questions as to how a Farage premiership will conduct itself on the international stage, particularly with countries that have traditionally factored the UK into their foreign policy calculations.

These include the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, home to significant expat British populations and business interests. While deciphering a Farage-inspired foreign policy is not an immediate priority, the UK’s fractious political landscape suggests that it is better for the GCC to be prepared.

Unfortunate Victims

A key argument made during the Brexit referendum was that the UK would be able to negotiate free trade agreements with whoever it wants. Since June 2022, successive British governments have held six rounds of talks with the GCC for such an agreement. Notoriously tricky to navigate, these often take years to get over the line. Given Britain’s current political climate, that could be long enough for a Farage-led party to build popular support and win a general election. It would be naïve to assume that this vehicle would backpedal on initiatives that ultimately define its existence, not to mention one underpinned by an estimated £65.2 billion-worth of trade between the UK and GCC.

But neither should the GCC expect relations with a Farage government to be frictionless. Immigration is one possible source of tension, with Reform tapping into concerns that illegal migration is adversely impacting already-depleted public services. A toxic mix of social media and populist commentators further to the right of Farage also warn that the indigenous British population and traditional values are being eroded by an influx of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries.

Citizens from the GCC could be unfortunate victims of what comes next. Reform’s migration pledges include new rules preventing international students from bringing dependents into the UK. In 2020, the Council for Arab-British Understanding highlighted that almost 22000 Gulf students were enrolled at British universities, some presumably with families in tow. This could stop under a Farage-led administration, potentially leaving institutions with campuses in GCC states vulnerable to retaliatory measures by host governments.

Reform’s determination to enhance domestic energy security could also prove costly for the GCC. British government statistics indicate that fossil fuel imports from Middle Eastern and North African states reached £19.3 billion in the first year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. With £6.9bn-worth of exports, Qatar was the main GCC beneficiary followed by Saudi Arabia (£3.4bn), Kuwait (£2.6bn) and the United Arab Emirates (£2.5bn). Reform plans to decrease reliance on overseas resources by fast-tracking licenses for North Sea oil and gas extraction, as well as overseeing a safe return to fracking.

Stop, Look, and Listen

An obvious channel for tackling bumps in the road would be free trade negotiations, which are traditionally facilitated by the UK’s civil service machinery. Reform’s ‘contract’ nevertheless envisages the replacement of senior civil servants with fixed-term political appointees from the private sector. It’s possible that GCC negotiators would welcome the opportunity to engage with a new breed of civil servant that understands business ahead of bureaucracy and protocol. They should do so with a degree of caution.

From Donald Trump to Viktor Orbán, populist politicians often highlight the existence of a ‘deep state’ working on behalf of ‘the establishment.’ Given Farage’s close relations with the former, it’s easy for critics to attribute Reform’s plans for the UK’s civil service to paranoid conspiratorial thinking. The fact that Reform plans to politicize an organization where impartiality is (theoretically) sine qua non should nevertheless be the greater concern. It also remains to be seen how the wider British electorate would respond to private sector leadership of civil service functions, particularly after the personal protective equipment controversy  that embroiled the last Conservative government.

Thanks to the UK’s fixed-term parliaments, GCC policymakers do not need to contemplate Nigel Farage’s ascension from political disruptor to high office for the time being. However, the results of the recent general election demonstrate that the country’s main political parties can no longer take the support of their core vote for granted. Nigel Farage’s contribution to the fragmentation of Britain’s political landscape should not be underestimated; and neither is it finished. It would be wise to make plans for his endgame.